Commit 53144b41 authored by Vlad Yasevich's avatar Vlad Yasevich Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key

[ Upstream commit 328fc47e ]

The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly
right.  It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is
sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).

Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct,
we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.
Signed-off-by: default avatarVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
parent 97348238
......@@ -3054,7 +3054,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(struct sock *sk,
goto out;
}
if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) {
if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment