Commit df0ba92a authored by Masahide NAKAMURA's avatar Masahide NAKAMURA Committed by David S. Miller

[XFRM]: Trace which secpath state is reject factor.

For Mobile IPv6 usage, it is required to trace which secpath state is
reject factor in order to notify it to user space (to know the address
which cannot be used route optimized communication).

Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.

This patch was also written by: Henrik Petander <petander@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMasahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 2ce4272a
...@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ struct xfrm_type ...@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ struct xfrm_type
void (*destructor)(struct xfrm_state *); void (*destructor)(struct xfrm_state *);
int (*input)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*input)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *skb);
int (*output)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *pskb); int (*output)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *pskb);
int (*reject)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *, struct flowi *);
int (*hdr_offset)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *, u8 **); int (*hdr_offset)(struct xfrm_state *, struct sk_buff *, u8 **);
xfrm_address_t *(*local_addr)(struct xfrm_state *, xfrm_address_t *); xfrm_address_t *(*local_addr)(struct xfrm_state *, xfrm_address_t *);
xfrm_address_t *(*remote_addr)(struct xfrm_state *, xfrm_address_t *); xfrm_address_t *(*remote_addr)(struct xfrm_state *, xfrm_address_t *);
......
...@@ -988,6 +988,23 @@ error: ...@@ -988,6 +988,23 @@ error:
} }
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_lookup); EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_lookup);
static inline int
xfrm_secpath_reject(int idx, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err;
if (!skb->sp || idx < 0 || idx >= skb->sp->len)
return 0;
x = skb->sp->xvec[idx];
if (!x->type->reject)
return 0;
xfrm_state_hold(x);
err = x->type->reject(x, skb, fl);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
/* When skb is transformed back to its "native" form, we have to /* When skb is transformed back to its "native" form, we have to
* check policy restrictions. At the moment we make this in maximally * check policy restrictions. At the moment we make this in maximally
* stupid way. Shame on me. :-) Of course, connected sockets must * stupid way. Shame on me. :-) Of course, connected sockets must
...@@ -1010,6 +1027,13 @@ xfrm_state_ok(struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, struct xfrm_state *x, ...@@ -1010,6 +1027,13 @@ xfrm_state_ok(struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, struct xfrm_state *x,
xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, family)); xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, family));
} }
/*
* 0 or more than 0 is returned when validation is succeeded (either bypass
* because of optional transport mode, or next index of the mathced secpath
* state with the template.
* -1 is returned when no matching template is found.
* Otherwise "-2 - errored_index" is returned.
*/
static inline int static inline int
xfrm_policy_ok(struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, struct sec_path *sp, int start, xfrm_policy_ok(struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, struct sec_path *sp, int start,
unsigned short family) unsigned short family)
...@@ -1024,9 +1048,12 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, struct sec_path *sp, int start, ...@@ -1024,9 +1048,12 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, struct sec_path *sp, int start,
for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) { for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) {
if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family)) if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family))
return ++idx; return ++idx;
if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
if (start == -1)
start = -2-idx;
break; break;
} }
}
return start; return start;
} }
...@@ -1046,12 +1073,15 @@ xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, unsigned short family ...@@ -1046,12 +1073,15 @@ xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, unsigned short family
} }
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_decode_session); EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_decode_session);
static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(struct sec_path *sp, int k) static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(struct sec_path *sp, int k, int *idxp)
{ {
for (; k < sp->len; k++) { for (; k < sp->len; k++) {
if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
if (idxp)
*idxp = k;
return 1; return 1;
} }
}
return 0; return 0;
} }
...@@ -1062,6 +1092,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -1062,6 +1092,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct xfrm_policy *pol; struct xfrm_policy *pol;
struct flowi fl; struct flowi fl;
u8 fl_dir = policy_to_flow_dir(dir); u8 fl_dir = policy_to_flow_dir(dir);
int xerr_idx = -1;
int *xerr_idxp = &xerr_idx;
if (xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, family) < 0) if (xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, family) < 0)
return 0; return 0;
...@@ -1086,8 +1118,13 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -1086,8 +1118,13 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, family, fl_dir, pol = flow_cache_lookup(&fl, family, fl_dir,
xfrm_policy_lookup); xfrm_policy_lookup);
if (!pol) if (!pol) {
return !skb->sp || !secpath_has_nontransport(skb->sp, 0); if (skb->sp && secpath_has_nontransport(skb->sp, 0, xerr_idxp)) {
xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
pol->curlft.use_time = (unsigned long)xtime.tv_sec; pol->curlft.use_time = (unsigned long)xtime.tv_sec;
...@@ -1107,11 +1144,14 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -1107,11 +1144,14 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
*/ */
for (i = pol->xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) { for (i = pol->xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
k = xfrm_policy_ok(pol->xfrm_vec+i, sp, k, family); k = xfrm_policy_ok(pol->xfrm_vec+i, sp, k, family);
if (k < 0) if (k < 0) {
if (k < -1 && xerr_idxp)
*xerr_idxp = -(2+k);
goto reject; goto reject;
} }
}
if (secpath_has_nontransport(sp, k)) if (secpath_has_nontransport(sp, k, xerr_idxp))
goto reject; goto reject;
xfrm_pol_put(pol); xfrm_pol_put(pol);
...@@ -1119,6 +1159,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, ...@@ -1119,6 +1159,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
} }
reject: reject:
xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl);
xfrm_pol_put(pol); xfrm_pol_put(pol);
return 0; return 0;
} }
......
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